The 2011 election in Ireland was one of the most dramatic elections in European postwar history in terms of net electoral volatility. In some respects the election overturned the traditional party system. Yet it was a conservative revolution, one in which the main players remained the same, and the switch in the major government 
Introduction
The announcement of a 'bailout' for the Irish state by the IMF/EU/ECB in November 2010 marked a critical point in the fortunes of the Irish economy and the state's fiscal problems which had been signalled to be in crisis two years earlier when the government felt it necessary to provide a blanket support to the Irish banks. Cuts had been made in many programmes and the pay of public sector workers had been reduced by an average of about 20 per cent. Unemployment soared, from 4.5 per cent at the time of the 2007 election to 14.5 per cent in early 2011. Even as the Dáil (lower house of parliament) approved the terms of the loan, under which stern targets with relation to taxation and spending were set and public policy would be monitored closely until the money was repaid, the government was disintegrating and an election followed soon in February 2011. The result was certainly dramatic: the major party of government and dominant force in the party system, Fianna Fáil (FF), was relegated to third place; the minor partner, the Green Party, lost all its seats; and Fine Gael (FG) became the largest party for the first time and formed a government with the Labour Party, which had almost doubled its vote. Measured in terms of net electoral volatility (the Pedersen index) this was one of the most dramatic elections in European post-war history, and it provided the biggest turnaround in party fortunes that had been seen without the intervention of a significant new party (Mair 2011 ). Yet it was arguably a conservative revolution, one in which the main players remained the same, and the switch in the major government party was merely one where one centre right party replaced another.
This can easily be interpreted as a classic case of economic voting, in which voters punished those responsible for the obvious decline in their collective fortunes, with the added element of public anger at the degree of mismanagement that had taken place (Key 1966; Powell and Whitten 1993) . We could also see it as further evidence that Ireland fits well into the modern characterisation of political competition as 'valence' politics (Marsh et al. 2008; Stokes 1963; Clarke et al. 2009 ), centred on the economy. This argues that voters will choose the parties seen as most competent to deal with the main -typically economic -issues, and the voters had lost faith in FF as the crisis unfolded. Indeed, poll evidence shows FF support declining sharply as successive stages of the crisis seemed to demonstrate the ineptitude of the government before the more objective indicators were there to confirm economic decline (Marsh and Mikhaylov 2012) . Support went to the obvious alternative, FG and Labour, who had provided the (only) alternative government several times since 1948 but were untainted by responsibility, having been in opposition since 1997.
Yet there were expectations in some quarters, and these have echoes internationally, that the crisis might provide a change in the bases of electoral decision-making. This occasion could have been one in which 'policy' choices -and by that we mean choices about how to deal with the crisis -could have been more prominent than they were in recent elections, when the issues around economic management were apparently less urgent and less discussed. The crisis arguably exposed the neo-liberal model of economic management, one that was followed by governments of both centre left and centre right across Europe for decades, as having fundamental weaknesses. In consequence there might have been some clear shift away from its tenets and at least a break-up of that consensus. Different groups might define the crisis in different ways -perhaps as a fiscal problem, or by highlighting unemployment -and they may also have different solutions, such as raising taxes on the rich, or cutting expenditure on social welfare. This could have encouraged a sharper left-right divide. Certainly parties of the 'left' did unprecedentedly well, winning arguably 31 per cent of the vote, 1 but whether this signified that voters were making an explicit choice of a policy alternative, rather than simply running to anyone but FF, is far less obvious.
While crises such as the Irish one might shake people and institutions out of traditional, almost habitual patterns of behaviour, it is important to acknowledge that such patterns may also be hard to dislodge. There are at least a couple of features of Irish politics that might constrain change. One is the 'personal vote', the following that candidates have which may be independent of party; more generally, this includes the importance of candidate relative to party (Carty 1983; Komito and Gallagher 2010; Marsh 2007) . While the appeal of particular candidates obviously did not save Fianna
Fáil from an electoral drubbing, it may still be the case that voters' concerns to pick a candidate may inhibit a more ideological politics (e.g. Sacks 1976) . A second is the behaviour of the parties. Arguably, for voters to change, parties have to lead the way.
In the past, parties have generally obscured rather than highlighted ideological differences. We will explore the extent to which this was different in 2011.
These are the primary features of the election that will be explored in this paper. We will start by looking at the vote in terms of punishment and reward, and consider the importance of blame attribution. We look at what voters thought about the crisis: who was to blame, and who could do a better job in the future. FF did very badly, but how far can the economic crisis explain the scale of the defeat, and the victory or FG and Labour? We will also consider a broader 'valence' model such as those advanced by Clark et al. (2009) in which leader and parties are judged in terms of competence to govern. We will then explore how far voters seemed to see this as an election not simply about replacing the government, but of making a choice about future policy directions, with a cleavage along typical economic left-right lines.
Who was to blame?
There can be little doubt that voters held the government responsible for the crisis, although that is not to say that blame lay solely with that body. The government In previous elections in this century there was a greater difference of opinion among voters when it came to blaming, or crediting governments, and also more variation in perceptions of the government's economic record. Table 2 shows the voters' judgment of the record, the attribution of credit/blame and also considerations as to whether another government might have done better.
<<INSERT A simple multinomial logit model regressing vote on just the variables displayed in It has been argued that assessments of leaders play a critical role in voters' electoral choice, although many argue that the effects, while they may be critical in a close election, are relatively small in the context of a party's overall vote. It is of course problematic to separate leader and party evaluations, since each may be contaminated by the other (see Clarke et al. 2009; Curtice and Holmerg 2005; W Miller and Shanks 1996) . Keeping this in mind we explored the added value of leader evaluations for the models run above. The question items used here all asked voters to say how good a leader was at "running the country", using a 0-10 scale. This was asked of four party leaders in 2011, those of FG, FF, Labour and SF, but only of a subset of these in previous studies. The FG leader was rated more highly than the FF leader only in 2011, but even then his lead was much smaller than the FF lead in 2002 and 2007.
If we add these leader variables to the first regression model discussed earlier, explained variance for 2011, using all four leaders, rises from .17 (see Table 3) to .28. 8 Adding just the FF and FG leaders, it also improves in each of the three years. 
Evidence for issue based voting
So far the evidence suggests that valence politics, at least with respect to the economy, were no less important in 2011 than in previous years. We now move on to look at whether or not judgements about competence were supplemented by concerns about the direction of policy, most notably in relation to the economy, but also the substitution of non-economic issues for economic ones. On this second point the salient issue of the 2011 election as measured directly by surveys was the economy, but within that fairly broad concern voters did emphasise different aspects of the overall problem. Asked to name the two most important issues to them personally, 58
per cent mentioned some aspect of the crisis, and 54 per cent a more specific economic issue. Twenty six per cent highlighted the fact that the government or the system had let them down, but another 26 per cent mentioned another (essentially non economic) issue, the most frequently cited being the health system. Overall, a massive 86 per cent of voters mentioned either the crisis or an economic issue. With respect to particular economic issues, most (43 per cent) highlighted job creation. Perhaps this might plausibly be seen as indicating a concern for the policies of growth over those of austerity. Just over 50 per cent of Labour and SF supporters talked about jobs, as against 40 per cent of FF voters and just 37 per cent of FG voters. More generally, however, the issues mentioned by each voter generally relate weakly, if at all to electoral choice, and even job creation explains less than 1 per cent of the variance in vote choice. All parties' manifestos recognised job creation as necessary, but there is also some evidence from opinion polls during the campaign that Labour outperformed FG on the jobs issue, while on the deficit and the banking issue FG was most capable (Marsh and Cunningham 2011, 188-189) . Dealing with the crisis required policies to fill the hole in the public finances. Job creation, all agreed, was one part of that, although the parties on the left, like the trade unions, saw a stronger role for government in achieving it.
More generally, the choice was one of increasing state income and/or reducing expenditure, the tax/ spend trade-off that typically separates left and right. The terms of the IMF/EU/ECB deal were set by the time of the election, and only SF -perhaps knowing it would be in opposition anyway -promised to tear up the agreement. There were differences between parties over the time scale for eliminating the deficit with trade unions and SF setting a longer time horizon. FG and Labour (and SF) differed on the balance of tax increases and expenditure cuts, with SF arguing for more taxes on the most well off, FG resisting almost any increase in direct taxation and Labour looking to cut the deficit using tax increases and spending cuts equally (Suiter and Farrell 2011, 36-38) .
Two questions were asked in the election study about this trade-off. One was the conventional increase tax/cut spending item and the other, in the spirit of the times, counter posed tax increases and small cuts with no tax increases and larger cuts. 14 Of course it is possible that left right self-placement is not about economic or even equality issues as much as it is about other issues, such as a broadly religious vs.
a secular view of society. Indeed, when an item asking whether or not God exists is added to the regression it out performs all other items and more than doubles the variance explained. Party support explains a lot more than economic, or religious factors, raising the possibility that placement may be better seen as a consequence rather than as a cause of vote choice (see also Marsh et al. 2008 ).
Parties and candidates
One factor commonly seen to inhibit issue-based representation is the importance of individual candidates to voters, and the fact that candidate appeal is rooted in parochial activities and concerns. Such attitudes might be a factor in obscuring the sort of relationships we have been exploring here, and that the 'clientelist' mode of politics which sustains the importance of candidate is one which inhibits the development of (national) issue centred politics, particularly around a left right economic cleavage (e.g. Higgins 1982; Sacks 1976) . One response to the crisis could have been to direct attention away from merely local concerns and onto national ones.
Anecdotal evidence from the campaign 'doorsteps' and earlier suggests some change.
A senior FG politicians explained to one author at the start of the crisis that he was being told by supporters that he belonged in Dublin, sorting out the country, rather than holding 'clinics' in his constituency; a senior Labour politician reported that he was being asked during the campaign to discuss solutions to the debt crisis rather than what could be done about local potholes in the road. Would 'policy' trump 'looking after the constituency' in 2011?
Assessing the weight of candidates and parties in the vote is far from being straightforward, as support for each almost certainly spills over to the other. Parties gain support from running a 'good' candidate, but the party label influences the way voters see that candidate. Parties certainly cultivate promising candidates, whether or not they have a long history in the party, and will often nominate those with close family ties to former incumbents, thus combining candidate and party assets.
Respondents in the election studies were asked whether party or candidate was most It is also notable that FF voters were now more likely to emphasise the candidate and FG voters less likely to do so. Overall this ties in somewhat with campaign polls, which seemed to show that voters stressed 'policy' more than in past years, and -though evidence here is more varied -placed less emphasis on picking a candidate to serve the constituency (Marsh and Cunningham 2011, 184-186) . 15 However, there is little sign that the more party-centred voter is any more likely to behave ideologically. There are only modest differences between party and candidatecentred voters in model fit. 16 This seems on the face of it a curious result. While questions might be asked of the measure of party centredness here (but see fn 15) the fact remains that overall the ideological model fits poorly.
One further reason for that could lie in the parties and how they present themselves rather than with concerns of the voters. We have referred in passing to the stances taken by parties in the 2011 election, but we can now look at this more systematically, comparing position in 2011 to those in earlier years.
We used the data from the Manifesto Project for the elections since 1992 to 2011.
Following Lowe et al. (2011) we rescaled the data using the empirical logit transformation that better captures the characteristics of underlying data, dynamic movement of parties on the dimensions of interest over time, and spatial politics assumptions about the range of ideal points (for details see also Benoit et al. 2012 ).
We will look here at just three things: State involvement in economy
17
, State-provided services 18 and finally, the general left-right dimension 19 . In each case we will show results for the positions of parties and also for the importance of the issue. What we are looking for here is evidence of a change in the 'supply side' in 2011, an indication that on economic issues in particular, as well as in broader left right terms, the electorate was offered a sharper choice in this election than previously, which might have provided the voters with a clearer definition of the differences between the parties. We are also interested in whether there is any substance behind the apparent rightward shift by voters evident in the earlier analysis, particularly around Table 5 and 
<<INSERT FIGURE 3 ABOUT HERE>>

Conclusion
This paper explores the 2011 election in Ireland, which was fought in the immediate aftermath of a 'bailout' made necessary by a major fiscal and banking crisis. In some respects the election overturned the traditional party system. This provides an extreme case of poor economic performance under the incumbent government, made more stark by the fact that the main incumbent party had been in office for 14 years. The central question was how well we can understand the result in these terms, as a classic case of retrospective voting. It appears to be a good illustration of economic voting:
when the economy appeared to be in good shape the government was returned, and when it was performing very poorly, and it was very sick indeed in 2011, the government was punished. There is, however, no clear sign in this analysis that it was the variation in economic evaluations in 2011 as such that mattered, perhaps because there was such widespread agreement that matters were critical. More important were the perceptions of accountability and the assessment of the alternative. This approach also does tell us much about the performance of the other parties in the system and why FG seems to capitalise best on FF's collapse. More general models incorporating leaders not surprisingly perform better without telling us quite why the earthquake was so devastating.
We also explored the possibility that the crisis prompted some change from an election driven by the choice of the most competent party, to one driven by a concern for what a party might do, a shift to positional voting away from valence voting. One possibility was that the growth in the vote for parties of the left seen in 2011 was directly attributable to the nature of the crisis, with more people adopting left wing positions. Indeed, to the extent that the crisis is an indictment of neo-liberal economic management, we might have expected some redefinition of Irish electoral competition.
Again, there was little sign of this. The electorate, if anything, seemed to move to the right, and perceived parties -even left wing ones -as doing so too. We looked at a number of policy choices and preferences, most notably the tax/spend trade-off, but could find no sign that the electorate engaged with parties in these terms. These sorts of issues, or attitudes had at best a very weak relationship with vote choice in 2011, just as they did in earlier years. A possible exception is that a voter's own location of themselves on a left-right spectrum does relate strongly to vote choice, but it is argued here that the evidence suggests this is a placement that reflects vote as much as it determines it, with placement very weakly linked to issues.
We then considered two reasons why issue voting of this sort was so weak. The first is the importance of candidates rather than parties for many voters, an importance that is arguably linked more closely to the provision of real and imaginary benefits to an area than to a candidate's ideological position. Voters did seem to give more weight to parties this time, claiming that parties (and policy) were more important. However, more party-centred voters appear to be hardly more ideological than their counterparts.
We also looked at the supply side: were the parties offering a clear choice to the voters. The pattern here was generally in accord with voters' self-placements and assessments: parties moved to the right and the distance between them did not change significantly and arguably remained small. If voters did not vote in accordance with their views on taxing and spending, for instance, perhaps this was in part due to their chronic and understandable inability to distinguish what the parties were promising. This is in line with what LeDuc and Pammett (in press) call the "politics of discontent", where governing parties may be replaced without any serious discussion of the crisis (causes and solutions) in the campaign by all parties. They suggest this is partly because parties arrive at an implicit consensus on the direction of economic policy and do not formulate alternative economic policy solutions, but it can also be difficult to present clear alternatives to the voters when this has not been the norm in the past. Mair (1992) argued that the reasons for the weakness of the left in Ireland lay not with the weakness of industrialisation -hardly plausible now -not even with 'clientelism' -but rather with the unusual ability of FF to attract support across the social spectrum and with the strategy of the Labour Party to opt for a small share in government rather than continued opposition whenever it was offered. This state of affairs has served to sustain valence politics, particularly when the national cleavage that underlay the FF-FG division lost its salience. FF's dominance is unlikely to be repeated, but with a FG/Labour government in place, and FF/SF in opposition, there is little more clarity on offer as yet and the odds are that valence based voting will predominate over substance based positional voting for some time to come. This analysis carried some implications for comparative research. Firstly, while it does provide a good example of economic voting, it shows clearly attribution is a most important element in voters' calculations, and here this helps to show how some voters rationalised their decision to stay with FF or switch to an alternative. In general this alternative was seen as better able to do a good job; those who blamed FF, but
were not attracted by the alternative opted for 'third' parties and independents.
Secondly, this case shows little sign that the current crisis has prompted any significant move towards a more policy salient vote. Perhaps there are features of Irish politics that have traditionally discouraged such a focus. If so, these have not changed markedly, and even if voters claim to be more party centred, those parties did little to identify their own policy responses clearly in the public mind. Of course the lack of change should be seen in the context of the timing of the election as the first one of the economic crisis. It was natural for voters to switch to parties that might be similar, but different: a familiar set of parties, who could not easily be blamed for the disaster. If there is little improvement before the next election, due in 2016, that might prompt a greater change, but even so the absence of a clear left and right element in government-opposition conflict suggests that even though the next election might see a high level of volatility, it will not be driven by stronger positional voting. Importance 3 We included party identification to allow for the possibility that many voters would view the world through partisan spectacles (Campbell et al. 1960; Duch, Palmer, and Anderson 2000 ; see also Evans and Andersen 2006 for a stronger critique). For a contrary view see Green et al. (2002) . Partisanship -measured by the question asking are you close to any political party -is very low, with only about a quarter of voters admitting to such an identification, and dropping to 20 per cent in 2011, as FF partisans vanished. Clearly, this measure cannot be seen as wholly independent of recent experiences. We opted for a simple model without interactions (c.f. Marsh and Tilley 2010) because including the responsibility measure and the assessment of an alternative ran the risk of overcorrecting for a partisan bias. As we see, the partisanship variables seem to be doing most of the work. Without them the pseudo R 2 is much lower, .08, .04 and .05 respectively. 4 The parameters of multinomial models are not directly interpretable but their significance can be immediately discerned. Much of our discussion below specifically revolves around the analysis of significance of individual coefficients (and overall model performance). However, in multinomial models coefficients can be calculated only in relation to the baseline category (Fine Gael in our case), while we would prefer to have the effects for all parties. This can be achieved by changing the focus from the logit coefficients to the marginal effects that can be calculated for all categories (parties). The marginal effects in multinomial models capture the impact of a change in the predictor on the probability of observing each of several alternative outcomes. The table presents average marginal effects (AMEs) for each of the alternatives with corresponding uncertainty estimates. The reported results are derivatives (or discrete first-differences for factor variables) of the response with respect to the key predictors, i.e. it captures a change in the response for a change in the predictor. 5 All other parties are included with Independents as Others. The numbers voting for each of these are too small to analyse usefully in this manner. Independents are a very disparate group and we have not shown the independents/others effects, but they are generally not significant. 6 Full results from this estimation are not shown here to preserve space. They are available from the authors upon request. 7 A special feature of 2011 that attracted comment was the degree of anger felt by many voters as they were let down by the government and the financial elite, and politicians in general, with large salaries and generous expenses and very comfortable pensions and severance payments. On a scale of 1-5, where 5 is 'extremely angry' the median voter was at 4: very angry at "how things were going in the country these days". Including this emotion adds only marginally to the fit of the models run above, but does suggest SF and Independent voters were even angrier than those of FG and Labour. 8 The results are available from the authors upon request. 9 I would like you to look at the scale from 0 to 10 below. A '0' means government should CUT TAXES A LOT and SPEND MUCH LESS on health and social services, and '10' means government should INCREASE TAXES A LOT and SPEND MUCH MORE on health and social services. Where would you place yourself in terms of this scale? This scale has been reversed in the discussion here, so that 'left' is 0 and 'right' is at 10. In 2011, arguably, the choice was not so much one between increasing tax or cutting spending, but how much tax should increase and how far spending should be cut. For this reason the INES asked a second question: I would like you to look at the scale from 0 to 10 on this card. A '0' means government should MAINTAIN TAXES and SPEND LESS on health and social services, and '10' means government should INCREASE TAXES A LOT and SPEND THE SAME on health and social services. Where would you place yourself in terms of this scale. There is very little difference in either the distribution, or the effects on vote between these two wordings. 10 We find much the same picture if we look at another measure designed to tap positions on a left right scale. There was an increase in support for more rather than less regulation in 2011, for instance, although there was also an increase for private rather than public enterprise. 11 Full results are available from authors upon request. 12 Full results are available from authors upon request. 13 A similar analysis was carried out on the 1990 World Values study, but with different measures and results that suggested bigger differences between parties than we find here: see Hardiman and Whelan (1994) . 14 This was the final wave of a five-wave study, and even though it was supplemented to achieve a more representative sample, it is likely that the voters in 2007 were more sophisticated than those in 2002 or 2011. 15 Such self-reporting may be considered unreliable, and may reflect a perception that parties should be more important rather than real motivation. However, there is separate evidence that more voters did give a priority to parties. Those voting a 'straight ticket' -giving a preference to all candidates for one party before those of a second party, did rise in 2011. This comes from the mock ballots filled in by election study respondents. (For a discussion of this method see Marsh et al., 2008.) Moreover, those who said they were more party centred did fill in their ballots in a more party centred way. Using the combined measure above, only 34 per cent of candidatecentred voters cast a straight ticket compared with 55 per cent of party-centred voters. Comparable percentages for 2002 and 2007 are 23 and 58, and 27 and 58. 16 For 2011, Pseudo R 2 is 0.028 and 0.019 for party and candidate centred voters respectively using the variables in Table 4 , column 3 without party attachment. If a behavioural measure (and the number of cases is necessarily smaller here) it is used, R 2 for those voting a straight party ticket is 0. 043 and 0.025 for those who do not. 17 Lowe et al. (2011) define the `right' side of the dimension State involvement in economy as a combination of positive reference to free enterprise, economic incentives, economic orthodoxy, welfare state limitations, and negative references to protectionism. The `left' side is defined by positive references to market regulation, economic planning, protectionism, controlled economy, nationalisation, welfare state expansion, education expansion, and labour groups. Position on the dimension is then scaled as the empirical logit transform of the difference between right and left. Thus more negative positions reflect more `leftist' positions. 18 Lowe et al. (2011) define the `right' side of the dimension State-provided services as a combination of positive reference to welfare state limitation, education provision limitation. The `left' side is defined by positive references to welfare state expansion, and education provision expansion. Position on the dimension is then scaled as the empirical logit transform of the difference between right and left. Thus more positive positions reflect more `rightist' positions. 19 General left-right is a combination of 26 categories from manifesto analysis, capturing a variety of left and right issues.
